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Radical, Getting to the Root: a review of Curriculum Dynamics:  Recreating Heart1 
 
by Dewey I. Dykstra, Jr. 
 
Curriculum Dynamics, volume 200 in Counterpoints: the Studies in the 
Postmodern Theory of Education series, by M. Jayne Fleener, published by Peter Lang 
Publishing, Inc., contains an interesting introduction to postmodern perspectives and 
their sources from many fields.  Parts of the book together with its bibliography 
constitute a possible course of study in postmodernist thought.  Some might take issue 
with this description by pointing out examples of missing works considered important 
or items they consider soft in the bibliography.  If the reader has wondered about 
postmodernism, yet has never read about it, the bibliography and the references in the 
entries are not a bad introduction.  This is especially true if one were to focus more on 
references to primary sources and less on popularizers and secondary sources in the 
bibliography. 
Fleener presents the book in three sections: perspective, technique and creation.  
The section on perspective portrays a postmodernist perspective in contrast with a 
description of a modernist perspective and justifications for departure from this 
modernist perspective in part motivated by developments in 20th century science.  I will 
come back to this material on scientific revolutions and subsequent references to it, later 
in this review.  The section on technique, sub-titled: Holographic Images, promotes an 
emphasis on process, relationships and systems.  In the final section on creation Fleener 
suggests the curriculum should be viewed as other than linear, invoking Doll’s (1993) 
notion of richness in the form of curriculum as matrix.  Fleener’s notion is not a 
curriculum based on things to be known, but curriculum as process---curriculum as 
process should be the organizing essence of schools. 
For many readers, this one included, there is much to agree with in the issues 
presented in the book concerning the modernist perspective as a major source of the 
failures of education as it is today.  In particular the notion of the logic of dominance in 
the prevailing modernist perspective and the violence perpetrated in the name of this 
notion on students as individuals and thereby on society as a whole is a problem that 
can be seen daily in school. (Trabal, 1997; Blades, 1997)  Reflected in Fleener’s words:  
‘What they learn is not more about … concepts but that either they are not good at 
mathematics or that mathematics is stupid or irrelevant to their lives.’ (p. 192) the 
negative effects resulting from this domination point of view can be seen.  One can 
substitute the name of any academic subject in a paraphrase of these words and still be 
right on the mark. 
Education driven by competition and the desire to select the best cannot really be 
in the best interest of all students.  It is not education.  It is vocational selection and 
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training.  Selection and training, whether for the trades or the professions, has its place 
in society, but this is not education.  Education should be about process, relationship 
and the invocation of the potentials that exist in all students, as Fleener points out.  
Education as it is practiced today serves as an important demonstration that education 
and vocational selection and training may in fact never mix well. 
In Curriculum Dynamics, the notion of a learning organization is suggested as an 
alternative to “education” as it is practiced today.  A learning organization, teachers 
and students driven by the desire to engage in meaning making and being in a state of 
constant process, is a collaboration of many individuals each of whose experience of the 
process is personal.  Each individual’s participation and experience in this organization 
is that person’s curriculum.  This way of conceptualizing curriculum as a dynamic 
entity is neither a linear and completely predetermined collection of things to be 
known, nor exactly predictable. 
These two positions, the modernist logic of dominance and curriculum as 
individually experienced process, have major implications concerning developments in 
education in the USA such as high-stakes testing and the nature of pressures brought on 
by such testing on the curriculum, teachers and students in this country today.  Fleener 
comments on such matters and a number of other related points, as well. 
Fleener makes reference to scientific revolutions and draws implications from 
these in weaving the new cloth of curriculum dynamics in the book.  In particular, 
explanations of developments in the first half of the previous century in physics are 
used to explain and justify the author’s ideas.  It may be that the reviewer’s formal 
preparation and background in physics, in physics teaching from middle school 
through the university level and studies in pedagogy and the nature of knowledge had 
something to do with the invitation to produce this review.  It may help the reader to be 
aware of these perspectives in this reviewer’s take on Fleener’s book. 
There are a number of problems with the science in the book.  First, there are 
problems with the science as it is presented in the book.  Einstein did not propose a 
theory of specific (p. 60) relativity in 1905.  The relativity theory he first proposed in that 
paper was, and is still, called the theory of Special Relativity.  To use another adjective 
at this point, nearly 100 years later, without explaining why, is very disconcerting to 
anyone who has studied or read Einstein’s work some of which is intended for the lay 
reader. (Einstein, et al., 1924; Einstein, 1995)  It might be better to explain that the 
adjective, Special, was adopted to distinguish the fact that Einstein’s first foray into 
relativity theory applies only to situations in which the objects involved move with 
constant velocity, neither speeding up nor slowing down.  These situations are called 
inertial frames of reference.  His later work, General Relativity, was developed to apply 
to situations involving objects possibly speeding up or slowing down or changing 
direction.  The adjective, general, was adopted because the theory was more broadly 
applicable; that is, it is not restricted to objects that only move with constant velocity, 
inertial reference frames. 
Einstein did not ‘interpret’ gravity as a ‘magnet field’ (p. 62).  Instead, he 
proposed the existence of something called, spacetime, as what could determine the 
motion of an object such as the Moon, instead of another object removed from it by 
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some distance, such as the Earth, as those before him did.  To attribute the motion of 
one object to the influence of another object not in contact with the first is the hypothesis 
of action-at-a-distance.  An example of this would be the claim that the planets in our 
solar system orbit the Sun because of some action by the Sun on them through the 
intervening, largely empty space.  Another example of action-at-a-distance would be to 
claim the action of the Earth on a compass needle to cause that needle to move to a 
particular orientation. 
The explanation for such actions attributed to universal gravitation through 
intervening empty space has been a problem since well before Newton [in the late 
1600s].  Newton got around the problem essentially by saying, in his famous book, The 
Principia [originally written in the 1680s] (Newton, 1999), he made no hypotheses as to 
why, but that the behavior of the planets and Sun could be explained very well, if we 
assumed that forces existed between the objects and that these forces conformed to 
certain particular mathematical expressions.  Later, the notion of field was invented and 
invoked by others such as Maxwell [in the middle of the 19th century] to explain 
apparent action-at-a-distance in electric and magnetic phenomena.  One often given 
reason for Newton’s avoidance of the issue and the later efforts to make up an 
explanation for examples of apparent action-at-a-distance, is the modern scientists’ 
[scientists since the Renaissance] aversion to relying on insensible entities for 
explanation. 
 
About 200 years after Newton, Einstein proposed another alternative.  In this 
alternative he suggested we think of matter, what objects are made of, as distorting 
something they are immersed in called spacetime.  Up to this time people in general 
had considered space independent of the matter immersed in it.  Einstein was 
suggesting otherwise.  Furthermore, he suggested in effect that objects naturally move 
with the background “pattern” of this spacetime.  When spacetime is distorted, the 
motions of objects through such a distorted region will be distorted.  As John Wheeler 
(1999) has put it on many occasions: ‘Matter tells space how to bend and space tells 
matter how to move.’ 
To sum up, Newton avoided the problem of explaining action-at-a-distance by 
refusing to propose an explanation as to how a force could be exerted at a distance, 
merely supplying a mathematical description of the force.  Later, gravitational fields 
whose source is the mass in objects were proposed to explain these forces at a distance.  
Einstein’s proposal is that we think not in terms of fields with sources, but in terms of 
something else called spacetime, the source of which is not matter and which is both 
affected by matter and affects the motions of matter.  Einstein was distinctly not 
proposing a field explanation for gravity’s action-at-a-distance in the same sense that 
gravitational fields are typically referred to now in textbooks in association with 
Newtonian mechanics.  It is very telling about “education” as it is practiced today that 
even physics majors can go a remarkably long way into and even all the way through 
their preparation and be blissfully unaware of these distinctions. 
There are a number of other issues with the science in the book.  To treat each 
one in the same way as above would make for a long review and the beginnings of a 
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textbook.  These issues are much less to have occurred in the book had we all 
experienced education in a learning organization as Fleener suggests.  A list of a few of 
these follows.  The list is in no particular order nor is it exhaustive. 
1. The E in E = mc2 stands for energy in Einstein’s work.  What E as an ‘energy 
dynamic between mass and speed’ (p. 64) might mean does not come from 
physics or Einstein. 
2.  ‘Velocity at or faster than the speed of light is impossible (without having 
infinite mass)’ (p. 64) seems to imply that with infinite mass an object could 
travel at the speed of light or faster.  The problem with this implication is the 
following.  In the theory the reason for the impossibility of traveling at the 
speed of light is that the effective mass of the object becomes very nearly 
infinite as the object approaches that speed and the necessary energy to get it 
moving ever faster to actually reach the speed of light does not exist in the 
universe. 
3. Maxwell did theoretically determine the speed of light.  I have never seen any 
reference to Maxwell experimentally determining the speed of light as 
suggested. (p. 65) Others, including Albert Michaelson and Albert Roemer, 
did determine the speed of light by various experimental means.  
Michaelson’s name is misspelled in two different ways. (p. 61, p. 73) 
4. It is suggested that Einstein published three papers on quantum theory, 
statistical mechanics and Brownian motion and that ‘this third paper’ was on 
Einstein’s ‘specific theory of relativity.’ (p. 60)  There were what can be 
considered five papers in 1905. (Stachel, 1998)  But, the three of the four that 
appeared in Annalen der Physik are generally most prominently mentioned.  
These I believe are the ones to which Fleener refers.   One was on the 
photoelectric effect and heuristically proposed the use of Planck’s quantum 
hypothesis.  One was on the Brownian motion of tiny particles suspended in 
water and could be associated with the field of statistical mechanics.  The 
third paper with the title given in the book was an exposition of his theory of 
Special Relativity.  I know from first hand experience that the photoelectric 
effect and special relativity papers can be read and understood with a high 
school background in science.  A fourth paper, an additional one developing 
further notions in special relativity, appeared in Annalen der Physik that 
year.  The fifth paper was a doctoral dissertation on a topic in statistical 
mechanics. 
5. While the paper on the photoelectric effect apparently had significant 
influence on thought about the quantum hypothesis at the time, it had 
nothing to do with the paper on special relativity.  Einstein’s work on 
relativity did not ‘set the stage for quantum physics’. (p. 64)  Even now a 
century later the satisfactory integration of relativity theory and quantum 
theory is still a matter of speculation. 
6. Waves are apparently equated with energy several times in the context of this 
discussion about ideas from physics. (pp. 66—67)  Nowhere in physics are 
energy and waves equated.  Energy and waves are not equivalent entities in 
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the explanations physicists generate about the world.  In quantum mechanics 
whether an entity appears to act as a particle or as a wave, it always has 
energy associated with it. 
7. Neither the Correspondence Principle nor Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle 
are stated nor explained in a way most physicists would recognize.  In fact 
each of these ideas seem to be supported as much or more by quotes from 
authors whose areas of expertise are business leadership and psychological 
self-help than from the writing of any physicists. 
8. ‘Newton’s notions of entropy’ (p. 109) are referred to, but the notion of 
entropy did not arise until many years after his death during an era when a 
number of physicists and mathematicians undertook to reformulate Newton’s 
contributions in such a way as to eliminate action-at-a distance forces from 
the theory and the resulting effort influenced new developments in studies of 
the thermal properties of matter. 
9. Kepler’s laws, not ‘Keplar’s laws’ (p. 111), are laws of planetary motion, not 
merely laws of motion.  They are not expressions applicable in general to 
motion, but specifically to the observed motion of the planets of our solar 
system around the Sun.  Newton, on the other hand, did propose three laws 
to describe motion in general and which are called Newton’s laws of motion. 
10. ‘The curriculum, therefore, like the information of a hologram, is distributed 
throughout the image.’ (p. 175)  In the case of holograms, information which 
enables the reconstruction of the image without the original object present is 
distributed throughout the hologram, not the image produced by the 
hologram.  The information received by a conventional lens is also distributed 
throughout the lens to enable it to produce its image. 
Unfortunately, this list does not exhaust the problems with the presentation of 
the science.  The trouble here is that Fleener is apparently trying to use this shift from 
classical physics and biology, with a focus is on describing order and absolutes, to 
modern physics and biology, with a focus is on emergent properties of complex 
systems, chaos and the loss of absolutes.  When the science is poorly presented, the 
impact of the justification based on it is blunted and there is cause to question the 
conclusions urged from the justification.  This is true regardless of the value of the 
conclusions urged.  Just as the argument presented in the book might be weak, there 
can be other, stronger justifications for essentially the same conclusions. 
The deeper problem in the argument presented is that the new sciences, what 
one might call the new physics (of the first half of the previous century) and the new 
biology (of the last half of the previous century), seem to be given a privileged status in 
the author’s narrative. It seems we are being asked to replace the notion of the existence 
of universal laws that describe order and predictability with another notion of the 
existence of universal laws that invoke disorderliness and unpredictability.  To claim or 
act as if either set of laws is a description of what is really going on is to take a realist 
position.  Prigogine and Stengers (p. 68) are not only urging that we abandon classical 
physics, but realism itself---‘the realism of classical physics’.  Rejection of realism 
changes the status of the specific explanations developed in science from statements 
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represented as at least tending toward a true description of what is actually going on to 
statements that at best can be said to fit experience and enable reasonable, testable 
predictions.  The cornerstone of the logic of domination is knowledge of the truth or 
knowledge of the truth absolutely better than some other knowledge.  Realism in 
particular establishes such knowledge categories and seems to lead inevitably to 
practices of domination.  Unfortunately, the author appears to be a victim, as are most 
of us, of the unrelenting modernist realism with which science is preached to society in 
the schools and the media.  Language in the section on science is often the language of 
absolutes, the realist, modernist language of domination.  Because of this immersion in 
realism, no curriculum of any type can escape this logic of domination unless realism is 
utterly abandoned. 
Explanatory knowledge as constructed or made up by human beings in an on-
going process and which can only be judged by its fit to experience cannot be used to 
justify domination because there is no way to compare it with Truth.  Possession of the 
Truth or something closer to it than others, ultimately justifies domination. (Maturana, 
1988)  This is not to say either that there is no real world out there or that we just make 
up that real world in our heads.  Instead, it is to suggest that what we make of our 
experiences is just that…what we make of them.  As long as what we make of our 
experiences, the explanation we construct for ourselves, continues to fit new 
experiences and serve our purposes, then we keep using our constructed explanations.  
When these constructions cease to fit experience or serve our purposes, we make new 
explanations.  We have no way of knowing to what extent our explanations are really 
what is going on nor do we have to know in order to continue to exist and pursue our 
lives.  This is a fundamentally non-realist view of explanatory knowledge and fits the 
notions of which Fleener writes:  learning organizations and curriculum as process and 
relationship to one’s experiential world including other people. 
Without going into detail on the science involved, one can say that the physics of 
the previous century places our previous ideas about the explanations of physical 
reality in perspective.  In the past for example, every time we thought we knew what 
light really is we eventually found something we could not explain.  To explain this 
new feature we had to reconceptualize light.  Light had to become something different.  
Very early in recorded history light was something that went out from our eyes to 
enable us to see things.  Later, it was rays that emanate from objects and enter our eyes.  
Then it was corpuscles, tiny material bits emanating from sources.  Next, it was 
undulations or waves of an all-pervasive, ethereal substance called aether.  In the 19th 
century it was thought to be undulations or waves of electromagnetic fields---fields 
which themselves were invented to explain action-at-a-distance.  Einstein showed that if 
light could be thought of as little packets of discrete quantities of energy, one could 
explain the photoelectric effect, a phenomenon unexplainable via a wave explanation of 
light.  In the title of Einstein’s 1905 paper, On a heuristic point of view concerning the 
production and transformation of light, (Stachel, 1998) he tells us his view of the status 
of a quantum explanation of the photoelectric effect.  He knew the lesson of history. 
In this view we have never had an explanation of the true nature of light and 
there is no reason from historical experience to think we ever will.  That is not the 
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nature of explanatory knowledge.  Explanatory knowledge cannot be about truth with 
an upper or lower case ‘t’.  It can only be about what works so far---abduction 
constructed in the minds of human beings.  As such it only exists in the minds of 
cognizing beings and is not independent of those minds.  This is the root of the matter---
the nature of knowledge.2  In this view curriculum can no longer be the Canon, a static, 
memorizable entity, but instead it is exercising the skills of evolving a canon, an 
emergent entity---curriculum as process.  Although Curriculum Dynamics has value, it 
misses the root that could support its conclusions. 
Another thing that seems to cut short the possible impact on education is that 
there were no examples discussed in any detail, not even analyses of partial examples to 
help us understand Fleener’s Erwartungshorizonten, horizons of expectation. (p. 5)  
Whether examples presented are taken as algorithms can depend on how they are 
presented as well as what the reader makes of them. 
There are good examples in math education that seem to clearly fit the spirit of 
the book.  The works of Paul Cobb, Terry Wood and Erna Yackel (1993) and of Deborah 
Shifter and Catherine Fosnot (1993) come immediately to mind, but examples stretch 
back at least to the 1930s and the work of Louis Benezet (1935a, 1935b, 1936) and Harold 
Fawcett (1938).  In science education Eleanor Duckworth (1996) seems to advocate and 
practice a pedagogy that is resonant with ideas in the book.  In the field of physics 
education research there is a growing amount of published work demonstrating the 
profound learning effects made possible by shifting attention from the canon to the 
students’ understandings of the phenomena and how little change in understanding 
results from conventional instruction. (Duit, 2002) 
These examples might not meet all of Fleener’s intents, but Fleener’s analytical 
discussion of such examples could help us understand the kinds of meaning, purpose 
and value intended in Curriculum Dynamics.  Existence proofs, even though they may 
be partial, do exist and their effects on the students are powerful.  Many in education 
are unaware of them, but should be.  Some sort of discussion of such examples by 
Fleener could help us better understand how the intent of the book differs from or is 
similar to what is going on in these examples. 
Curriculum Dynamics is a mixed bag: a place to start reading references to 
postmodernism, a rather poor place to pick up much understanding of the science 
written about in the book, and possibly a source of inspiration to think differently about 
the notions of curriculum and education.  The book is aptly described by the author in 
the following:  ‘My hope for those who read this book is that they find meaning, 
purpose, and value, not answers, prescriptions, or formulas to follow.’ (p. 6)  One might 
find meaning, purpose and value from the book, but a careful, thoughtful reader might 
                                                 
2 Since this view goes to the root, the nature of the central issue in education---the nature 
of knowledge, it can be called radical in the sense of ‘to go to the root of’, as opposed to 
the sense of being extreme or on the fringe.  Since knowledge is seen as construct, then 
this view is constructivist---radical constructivist, very similar to that of Ernst von 
Glasersfeld (1995). 
Curriculum Dynamics:  Recreating Heart (Counterpoints, vol. 200) 
M. Jayne Fleener (Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., New York, 2002), 215 pp., $29.95 (pbk), ISBN 0-8204-5540-7 
 
 8 
be hindered by the distractions of the presentation of the science and subsequent 
references to it and of the lack of rigor in the popularizers relied upon in the text. 
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